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Abstract
Critical to successful human interaction is a capac-
ity for empathy - the ability to understand and share
the thoughts and feelings of another. As Artificial
Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly required
to interact with humans in a myriad of settings, it is
important to enable AI to wield empathy as a tool
to benefit those it interacts with. In this paper, we
work towards this goal by bringing together a num-
ber of important concepts: empathy, AI planning,
and reasoning in the presence of knowledge and be-
lief. We formalize the notion of Empathetic Plan-
ning which is informed by the beliefs and affective
state of the empathizee. We appeal to an epistemic
logic framework to represent the beliefs of the em-
pathizee and propose AI planning-based computa-
tional approaches to compute empathetic solutions.
We illustrate the potential benefits of our approach
by conducting a study where we evaluate partici-
pants’ perceptions of the agent’s empathetic abili-
ties and assistive capabilities.
1 Introduction
Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly required
to interact with other agents (be they human or artificial), but
are still lagging in their ability to empathize with them when
reasoning about their behavior. In the context of AI planning
(the problem of selecting a goal-leading plan based on a high-
level description of the world), an empathetic agent should
be able to construct a plan that is harmonious with the goals,
beliefs, values, affective state, and overall perspective of a
fellow agent. Further, we are interested in facilitating the cre-
ation of empathetic agents holding a wide spectrum of roles
- from passive observers, to virtual agents that offer relevant
advice or act on someone’s behalf, all the way to embodied
agents who can physically interact with the environment and
other agents in it. To illustrate, consider Alice who lives with
panic disorder and agoraphobia. Alice fears crowded places
that might trigger a panic attack, and avoids busy restaurants,
malls, and buses. Thus, Alice would never use public transit
to get to work, despite it being the fastest way to get there.
Instead, the optimal plan for her to get to work (that she can
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come up with on her own) addresses her fear, and would typ-
ically require her to walk instead of taking public transit, re-
gardless of how suboptimal it might seem to an AI planning
system bent on minimizing cost and time. A plan involving
a crowded bus would simply not be executable by Alice. An
empathetic AI that knows of an empty bus going along a sim-
ilar route (which Alice believes is always crowded or simply
does not know about), could recommend to Alice that she
take it instead of walking, which would help her save time
and would not place her on a crowded bus.
To construct an empathetic AI that is able to empathize
with Alice and plan to assist her, we must provide it with
a means of adopting her beliefs and affective state. To build
towards this goal, our work brings together the notions of em-
pathy and epistemic planning, which is an emerging field of
research that combines AI planning and reasoning in the pres-
ence of knowledge and belief. We formalize the notion of
Empathetic Planning (EmP) which builds on these concepts.
EmP requires an empathizer to empathize with an empathizee
in order to construct plans that are faithful to the empathizee’s
view of the world. Specifically, we posit that in order to em-
pathize with another, one must have at her avail a sufficiently
rich representation and understanding of the beliefs and affec-
tive state of the agent with whom she is empathizing. Thus,
some of the settings we address, involving reasoning about
belief and affect, cannot directly be modelled as classical
planning problems. We therefore appeal to a rich epistemic
logic framework to represent the agent’s beliefs and affective
state. Lastly, we propose an epistemic planning-based com-
putational approach to solving the EmP problem, thereby en-
abling the use of off-the-shelf epistemic planning tools. Our
approach enables a sufficiently empathetic agent to generate
a plan that is at least as ‘good’ as the best plan the empathizee
can generate by herself, using her own beliefs and capabili-
ties. Finally, it is important to consider that a human’s behav-
ior does not always expose their intentions due to misconcep-
tions or computational limitations. We submit that empathetic
agents are well-suited for distinguishing between the underly-
ing intent of the behavior and the actual performed behavior.
Empathy is often thought of as the ability to understand
and share the thoughts and feelings of another and has an
extremely rich history, beginning with its philosophical foun-
dations and leading to research in fields such as psychology,
ethics, and neuroscience (e.g., [Coplan and Goldie, 2011;
Davis, 2018]). Empathy has been found to have two com-
ponents, an affective, low-level component, and a cogni-
tive, high-level component, with the two being interconnected
[Shamay-Tsoory, 2011]. The affective component allows one
to share the emotional experiences of another via affective
reactions to their affective states. The cognitive component
utilizes cognitive and affective Theory of Mind (ToM) - the
ability to represent the mental states of others - and allows
one to take the perspective of another, thereby facilitating rea-
soning over their mental or affective state. We focus on the
cognitive component of empathy, and work towards building
empathetic agents that can reason about the mental and af-
fective states of other agents. We submit that pro-social AI
agents should be equipped with a means of reasoning about
the affective state of humans. This type of reasoning will lead
to more socially acceptable behavior, as highlighted by re-
cent work [McDuff and Czerwinski, 2018]. While we do not
focus on affect in this work, our framework can be flexibly
extended with various models of affect. Lastly, we note that
while we aim to build assistive empathetic agents that are
benevolent, empathy can also facilitate malicious (or simply
self-serving) motivations through manipulation. As such, the
introduction of EmP encourages further exploration and dis-
cussion of these important areas.
There exists a large body of work on integrat-
ing empathy and ToM within intelligent agent
systems in, e.g., psychological therapy, and in-
telligent tutoring [McQuiggan and Lester, 2009].
[Pynadath and Marsella, 2005] created decision-theoretic
ToM agents that can reason about the beliefs and affective
states of other agents. However, this work has not appealed
to the computational machinery of epistemic planning.
Epistemic planning is an emerging field of research which is
rapidly developing (e.g., [Baral et al., 2017]). For example,
[Engesser et al., 2017] utilized epistemic planning and
perspective taking to facilitate implicit coordination between
agents. While the motivations driving their work and ours
overlap, their work differs from ours both computationally
and conceptually. Finally, the rich body of work on Belief-
Desire-Intention (BDI) has studied affect and planning in
the past (e.g., [Steunebrink et al., 2007]). However, BDI
approaches have typically required agent plans to be spec-
ified in advance and we instead appeal to the flexibility of
generative epistemic planning techniques to generate plans.
Our approach is enabled by our combined knowledge of
these fields of research and their decades-long development.
The main contributions of this paper are: (1) a formaliza-
tion of EmP; (2) a computational realization of EmP that en-
ables the use of existing epistemic planning tools; (3) a study
which demonstrates the potential benefits of EmP in a diver-
sity of domains.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we provide epistemic logic background and
define the Multi-agent Epistemic Planning (MEP) prob-
lem. We first present the multi-agent modal logic KD45n
[Fagin et al., 2004] which we appeal to in our specification
of EPR. Let Ag and P be finite sets of agents and atoms,
respectively. The language L of multi-agent modal logic is
generated by the following BNF:
ϕ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | Biφ
where p ∈ P , i ∈ Ag, φ, ψ ∈ L and Biφ should be inter-
preted as “agent i believes φ.” We choose to represent the
belief modality here so that we can model the false beliefs of
agents. Using the equivalence Kiφ = Biφ ∧ φ, recent work
on MEP has been able to capture both knowledge and beliefs.
The semantics for formulae in L is given by Kripke mod-
els [Fagin et al., 2004] which are triplets, M = 〈W,R, V 〉,
containing a set of worlds, accessibility relations between the
worlds for each of the agents (R = {Ri | i ∈ Ag}), and a
valuation map, V : W → 2P . When an agent i is at world
w ∈ W , M determines, given the accessibility relations in
Ri pertaning to w, what worlds the agent considers possi-
ble. A formula φ is true in a world w of a Kripke model
M = 〈W,R, V 〉, writtenM,w  φ, under these, inductively-
defined conditions: M,w  p for an atom p iff p ∈ V (w);
M,w  ¬φ iff M,w 2 φ;M,w  φ ∧ ψ iff bothM,w  φ;
and M,w  ψ, M,w  Biφ iff M,w
′
 φ ∀w′ ∈ W s.t.
Ri(w,w
′). We say that φ is satisfiable if there is a Kripke
model M and a world w of M s.t. M,w  φ. Further,
we say that φ entails ψ, written φ  ψ, if for any Kripke
model M , M,w  φ entails M,w  ψ. Next, we assume
some constraints on the Kripke model, with particular prop-
erties of belief, as discussed in [Fagin et al., 2004]. Namely,
we assume that the Kripke model is serial (∀w ∃v R(w , v)),
transitive (R(w , v) ∧ R(v , u) ⇒ R(w , u)) and Euclidean
(R(w , v) ∧ R(w , u) ⇒ R(v , u)), with the resulting proper-
ties of belief: i. Biφ∧Bi(φ⇒ ψ) ⇒ Biψ (K - Distribution);
ii. Biφ ⇒ ¬Bi¬ψ (D - Consistency); iii. Biφ ⇒ BiBiψ
(4 - Positive Introspection); and iv. ¬Biφ ⇒ Bi¬Biψ (5
- Negative Introspection). These axioms, together, form the
KD45n system where n signifies multiple agents in the envi-
ronment. Note that the formal mechanisms for planning are
described in the respective papers of the various off-the-shelf
epistemic planners (e.g., [Liu and Liu, 2018]). We provide a
logical specification of the multi-agent epistemic planning
problem that is not tied to a particular planner but rather pro-
vides a logical specification without embodying any of the
syntactic restrictions that have been adopted by various plan-
ners.
As mentioned, we appeal to epistemic planning, which
combines AI planning and reasoning over the beliefs and
knowledge of agents, to formally specify EmP.We appeal to a
syntactic approach to epistemic planning (as opposed to a se-
mantic one such as [Bolander and Andersen, 2011]) and rep-
resent the initial Knowledge Base (KB) and other elements
of the problem as arbitrary epistemic logic formulae. Further,
we appeal to a multi-agent setting in order to represent the
beliefs of the empathizer, the empathizee, and possibly other
agents in the environment.
Definition 1 (MEP) A multi-agent epistemic planning prob-
lem is a tuple 〈Q, I,G〉 where Q = 〈P ,A, Ag〉 is the MEP
domain comprising sets of atoms P , actions A, and agents
Ag, together with the problem instance description compris-
ing the initial KB, I ∈ L, and the goal conditionG ∈ L.
To define how an action a ∈ A updates the state of
the world in the epistemic planning framework, we follow
[Liu and Liu, 2018] who manipulates the KB with belief re-
vision and update operators (e.g., [Alchourro´n et al., 1985]),
◦ and ⋄, respectively. A deterministic action is a pair
〈Pre, {(γ1, ǫ1), ..., (γk, ǫk)}〉, where Pre ∈ L is called the
precondition of a, γi ∈ L is the condition of a conditional
effect, and ǫi ∈ L is called the effect of a conditional ef-
fect. A sensing action is a triplet 〈Pre, pos, neg〉, where
Pre, pos, neg ∈ L are the precondition, the positive result,
and the negative result, respectively. An action a ∈ A is ex-
ecutable wrt a KB I ∈ L if I  Pre(a). Suppose some de-
terministic action a ∈ A is executable wrt a formula φ ∈ L.
Liu and Liu [2018] formally define the progression of φ wrt
to a deterministic action a ∈ 〈Pre, {(γ1, ǫ1), ..., (γk, ǫk)}〉
as follows: let γi1 , ..., γim be all the conditions of condi-
tional effects s.t. φ  γi. Then φ
′, denoted by prog(φ, a),
is a progression of φ wrt a if φ′ = ((φ ⋄ ǫi1)...) ⋄ ǫim , where
ǫij is the effect corresponding to the condition γij . The pro-
gression of φ ∈ L wrt a sensing action a ∈ A and positive
result (resp. negative) is defined as φ+ = φ ◦ pos(a) (resp.
φ− = φ ◦ neg(a)). Let φ ∈ L and π = a1, ..., ak a se-
quence of actions. The progression of φ wrt π (with sensing
results for sensing actions) is inductively defined as follows:
prog(φ, ǫ) = φ; prog(φ, (a;σ)) = prog(prog(φ, a), σ) if
φ  Pre(a), and undefined otherwise. ǫ is an empty sequence
of actions. A solution to an MEP problem is an action tree
branching on sensing results, such that the progression of the
initial KB, I , wrt each branch in the tree entails the goal G.
3 Empathy
In this section, we discuss the notion of empathy, contrast
it with sympathy, and discuss possible characteristics of as-
sistive empathetic agents. As mentioned in Section 1, in-
spired by the rich history of empathy and its philosophical
foundations, we define empathy as the ability to understand
and share the thoughts and feelings of another. When taken
to the extreme, where an empathizer knows every thought
and feeling of an empathizee, the above definition embod-
ies an idealized notion of empathy which necessitates omni-
science. We later discuss more pragmatic notions of empathy,
which only require an empathizer to be empathetic ‘enough’
and are defined wrt a specific task. To contrast, consider the
Golden Rule, which asks us to treat others as we would like to
be treated. The rule assumes similarity, implying that others
would like to be treated the same way we would and, there-
fore, does not allow for the existence of multiple perspec-
tives, thus leading to sympathetic behavior [Bennett, 1979].
Empathy, on the other hand, allows an empathetic agent to
experience the world from the perspective of the empathizee.
In Section 6, we conduct a study and compare an empathetic
agent and a sympathetic agent.
Affect
As mentioned, cognitive empathy includes both cognitive
and affective components. If Emily empathizes with Al-
ice, she should be able to reason about Alice’s affective
state. There is an extremely rich body of work on theo-
ries of affect (e.g., [Lazarus, 1966]) and on the incorporation
of these theories into computational models of affect (e.g.,
[Gratch, 2000]) Further, previous work has formalized log-
ics of emotion for intelligent agents. E.g., Steunebrink et al.
[2007] defined a formal logic within a BDI framework
while Lorini and Schwarzentruber [2011] use a fragment
of STIT logic to formalize counterfactual emotions such
as regret and disappointment. Both of these logics appeal
to a notion of epistemics to formalize complex emotions
which are predicated on the beliefs of agents. Previous work
has also quantified emotional intensity using fuzzy logic
[El-Nasr et al., 2000]. Thus, there exists a multitude of ways
in which to integrate affect into our framework, and as part
of future work we will experiment with various extensions of
our approach.
Assistive Empathetic Agents
Before formalizing the notion of EmP, we discuss some of
the properties we believe should characterize an assistive em-
pathetic agent. More accurately, these are agents who wish
to empathize with another, as empathy is often thought of
as an ongoing process (or mountain climb [Ickes, 1997]). i.
Need for Uncertainty We posit that an agent who wishes
to empathize with another should be uncertain about the em-
pathizee’s values (e.g., [Hadfield-Menell et al., 2017]) and,
importantly, about her true beliefs about the world. Since the
quality of plans generated by an assistive empathetic agent
is predicated on the veracity of the empathetic agent’s model
of the empathizee, the empathetic agent should unceasingly
strive to align itself better with her. ii. Benevolence An as-
sistive empathetic agent should take it upon itself to benefit
the empathizee in a way that is aligned with the latter’s val-
ues. iii. ¬Machiavellianism As mentioned, empathy can
facilitate malicious intent. Thus, an assistive empathetic agent
should not be Machiavellian, i.e., use deception, manipula-
tion, and exploitation to benefit its interests. Interestingly,
empathy and Machiavellianism have been found to be nega-
tively correlated [Barnett and Thompson, 1985] - i.e., the will
to manipulate is present in Machiavellians, but the means by
which to do so are often not. Relatedly, a study conducted
by Chakraborti and Kambhampati [2019] showed that human
participants were, in general, positive towards an AI agent
lying, if it was done for the ‘greater good’. Such questions
should be explored further. E.g., when interacting with hu-
mans who wish themselves (or others) harm.
4 Empathetic Planning
In this section, we define the EmP problem and its solu-
tion. We will make use of the notation OBS (observer) for
the empathizer and ACT (actor) for the empathizee through-
out the paper; both are assumed to be in the set of agents
Ag in all definitions. To be helpful, an assistive empathetic
agent should be able to reason about the preferences of the
empathizee. In general, agent preferences can be specified
in various ways, including a reward function over states,
as is done in a Markov Decision Process (MDP), or by
encoding preferences as part of a planning problem (e.g.,
[Baier and McIlraith, 2008]). Preferences (or rewards) can
also be augmented with an emotional component which can
encode an aversion to negative emotions, while optimizing
for positive ones [Moerland et al., 2018]. To simplify the ex-
position, we focus on plan costs as a proxy for agent pref-
erences. We assume in this work that we have an accurate
approximation of ACT’s preferences over plans (in this work,
the lower the cost, the better the plan), and do not focus on the
problem of acquiring a faithful approximation of an agent’s
preferences.
Definition 2 (EmP) An empathetic planning problem is a tu-
ple Z = 〈Q, I,GACT〉, where Q = 〈P ,A, Ag〉 is an MEP do-
main, P , A, and Ag are sets of atoms, actions, and agents,
respectively, I ∈ L is the initial KB, and GACT ∈ L is ACT’s
estimated goal.
To illustrate, we partially model the example from Section
1 as an EmP problem (with Alice as ACT).
• I = BOBS at(ACT, home)
∧ BOBS travelsBetween(alternativeBus, home, work)
∧ BOBS crowded(alternativeBus)
∧ BOBS BACT¬ crowded(alternativeBus) ∧ ...
• GACT = at(ACT, work)
Definition 3 Given an EmP problem, Z = 〈Q, I,GACT〉, π is
an assistive solution to Z iff π solves 〈Q, I,GACT〉 and π ∈
Π∗ where Π∗ is the set of optimal solutions for 〈Q, I,GACT〉.
The solution to the EmP problem may vary if OBS is not
trying to help ACT achieve her goal (e.g., adversarial interac-
tion as in [Freedman and Zilberstein, 2017]). Throughout the
paper, we focus on finding assistive solutions.
We now formally define a pragmatic notion of empathy,
defined wrt the EmP problem. To this end, we first discuss
the notion of projection, where an agent can reason from
another agent’s perspective. Let 〈〈P ,A, Ag〉, I〉 be OBS’s
MEP domain and initial KB. A and I encode OBS’s be-
liefs about the world, including, importantly, its beliefs about
ACT’s beliefs about the world. To enable OBS to reason from
ACT’s perspective, we wish to project A and I wrt to ACT.
We define the projection of a formula φ with respect to
an agent i, proj(φ, i). Given φ, ψ ∈ L, and assuming φ
and ψ are in NNF form, proj(φ, i) = ψ when φ = Biψ
and is undefined otherwise. Both [Muise et al., 2015] and
[Engesser et al., 2017] similarly define projection operators,
with Muise et al.’s syntactic approach being similar to ours,
while Engesser et al. define a semantic equivalent.We project
A and the closure of I (defined as {ψ ∈ L | I  ψ}) wrt
ACT. Note that the closure will be infinite but for any prac-
tical computation we will limit generation of closure to the
relevant subset. We project every formula in the closure of I
and for every a ∈ A we project every precondition, and for
every conditional effect of a we project the condition and ef-
fect (we project the positive and negative results for sensing
actions). We refer to the result of the projection operation wrt
A and I as Aproj and Iproj , respectively.
Let Z = 〈Q, I,GACT〉 be an EmP problem. Let Π
∗
proj
and Π∗ACT be the sets of optimal solutions among Πproj
and ΠACT , respectively, where Πproj and ΠACT are the
sets of all solutions for 〈〈P ,Aproj , Ag〉, Iproj, GACT〉 and
〈〈P ,AACT , Ag〉, IACT , GACT〉, respectively. 〈P ,A
ACT , Ag〉
and IACT are ACT’s true MEP domain and initial KB, which
are typically not accessible to OBS. We say that OBS is selec-
tively task-empathetic wrt to ACT and Z iff Π∗proj = Π
∗
ACT .
That is, OBS needs to be empathetic ‘enough’ in order to gen-
erate, when projecting to reason as ACT, the optimal solutions
that achieve GACT and which ACT can generate on her own
(using only her beliefs and capabilities). Importantly, if OBS
is selectively task-empathetic wrt Z , she will generate a plan
that is at least as ‘good’ as the best solution ACT can generate
by herself, using her own beliefs and capabilities.
OBS’ solution could be better than ACT’s solution if
OBS has, for instance, additional knowledge or capa-
bilities that ACT lacks. In this case, a solution to the
EmP problem, π, may solve 〈〈P ,A, Ag〉, I, GACT〉 but not
〈〈P ,Aproj , Ag〉, Iproj, GACT〉. Returning to our example, re-
call that ACT avoids crowded buses and so will not board
the crowded bus that goes from her home to work. Thus, the
best plan ACT can come up with is walking from home to
work (assuming there is no alternative mode of transporta-
tion) since she believes the alternative bus is crowded. How-
ever, since OBS knows of an alternative bus that is relatively
empty, a better plan would include ACT taking the alterna-
tive bus. However, to make this plan executable in ACT’s
model, OBS must inform ACT that the bus is empty (e.g.,
inform(OBS, ACT, busInfo)). In this case, ACT’s goal of get-
ting to work, while ontic, requires epistemic actions such as
informing ACT of the bus’ status and the underlying MEP
framework can facilitate reasoning about the required epis-
temic action(s) to achieve the goal. To contrast, consider
Sympathetic OBS, who assumes that ACT shares its model
of the world. Thus, the optimal plan that solves 〈Q, I,GACT〉
consists of ACT taking the crowded bus, which is a plan that
is not executable in her true model, due to her panic disorder.
5 Computation
In this section, we describe how to compute a solution to the
EmP problem. In our computation and evaluation, we assume
that OBS is omniscient. In this case, a solution to an MEP
problem ‘collapses’ to a single path, as OBS has knowledge
of the results of the sensing actions. We call the sequence of
actions that defines the path a plan and say that its cost is the
number of actions in the sequence.
Computing a Solution to the EmP Problem
A solution to the EmP problem,Z = 〈Q, I,GACT〉, is a plan π
that belongs to the set of optimal plans which achieve GACT ,
Π∗. While GACT can be obtained in different ways (e.g., ACT
could explicitly tell OBS their goal or communicate it to a fel-
low agent), inferringGACT via plan recognition (i.e., the prob-
lem of inferring an actor’s plan and goal given observations
about its behavior) is of most interest to us. At an overview,
by solving the recognition problem we can set GACT to be the
goal most likely being pursued by ACT, given a sequence of
observations. While we do not focus on the recognition com-
ponent in this work, we have formalized the notion of em-
pathetic plan recognition in an unpublished manuscript and
proposed an integrative approach to empathetic planning and
plan recognition. Further investigation is left to future work.
To obtain a solution to the EmP problem, we solve the MEP
problem 〈Q, I,GACT〉 by using an optimal off-the-shelf epis-
temic planner.
Complexity Epistemic planning has been
shown to be computationally expensive (e.g.,
[Aucher and Bolander, 2013]). E.g., the encoding pro-
cess in RP-MEP, the epistemic planner proposed by
[Muise et al., 2015] and used in this work, generates an ex-
ponential number of fluents when transforming the problem
into a classical planning problem.
6 Evaluation
In our preliminary evaluation, we set out to (1) expose the di-
versity of tasks that can be captured by EmP (2) demonstrate
that existing epistemic planners can straightforwardly be
used to solve EmP problems and (3) to evaluate the benefits
of our approach as assessed by humans. To this end, we
constructed and encoded a diversity of domains, ran them
using an off-the-shelf epistemic planner and conducted a
study with human participants. For all of our experiments,
we used the latest version of the epistemic planner RP-
MEP [Muise et al., 2015] with the Fast Downward planner
[Helmert, 2006] with an admissible heuristic. Note that
various epistemic planners impose various restrictions on do-
main modeling and plan generation, and we will experiment
with different planners in the future. The various scenarios
used in our simulations and study represent a diversity of
every-day situations which illustrate the potential benefits of
our approach. Further, the scenarios involve Alice (as ACT)
and her virtual assistant (as OBS), including suggestions
(automatically generated solutions to an EmP problem) given
to Alice by OBS. We then present the results of the study.
We encode all scenarios as EmP problems, including the
beliefs of OBS and ACT and ACT’s goal, GACT (see example
in Section 4). We run RP-MEP once to compute a solution to
an EmP problem.
Experimental Setup The study aims to evaluate both
perceptions of the agent’s empathetic abilities and percep-
tions of the agent’s assistive capabilities, as assessed by
humans. To test this, participants were presented with 12
planner-generated textual scenarios (some of which are pre-
sented below) of either empathetic or sympathetic agents and
were asked to rate the following two claims pertaining to each
scenario on a 5 point scale ranging from strongly disagree to
strongly agree: (1) “The virtual assistant was able to success-
fully take Alice’s perspective” (reflecting our measure of par-
ticipants’ perceptions of the agent’s empathetic abilities); and
(2) “If I were Alice, I would find this virtual assistant help-
ful” (reflecting our measure of participants’ perceptions of
the agent’s assistive capabilities). Scenarios with empathetic
agents and scenarios with sympathetic agents were identi-
cal, except for the EmP solution generated by the agent. The
sympathetic agent assumes that Alice shares its model of the
world when computing a solution to the EmP problem. We
had a total of 40 individuals (28 female) participate, ranging
from 18 to 65 years old. Participants were recruited and com-
pleted the questionnaire via an online platform, and had no
prior knowledge about the study.
Scenario 1 Alice is on a bus headed uptown but believes
the bus is headed downtown. OBS suggests that Alice get off
the bus and get on the correct one. As claimed in Section 1,
empathetic agents are well-suited for distinguishing between
the underlying intent of the behavior and the actual performed
behavior. In this scenario, OBS can infer that Alice’s cur-
rent plan (riding the wrong bus) will not achieve her goal
of getting downtown, the underlying intent of her behavior.
Scenario 2 Alice is visiting her 91-year-old grandmother,
Rose. Rose cannot hear very well but feels shame when ask-
ing people to speak up. OBS detects that Alice is speaking
softly and sends her a discreet message suggesting she speak
louder. Alice’s goal is for her grandmother to hear her. This
goal could be achieved by Rose asking Alice to speak louder.
However, this plan will have a higher cost (due to Rose’s aver-
sion to asking people to speak louder) than the plan involving
OBS sending a discreet message to Alice. Scenario 3 This
scenario models the example from Section 1, where Alice is
trying to get to work and avoids crowded buses. OBS knows
about a relatively empty bus, which would save her time, and
suggests that Alice take it to work (in the sympathetic case,
OBS suggests the crowded bus). Scenario 4 Alice is try-
ing to get to her friend’s house and there are two ways lead-
ing there - one is well-lit and populated (but slower) while
the other is dark and deserted. Alice prefers to feel safe when
walking outside after dark. OBS suggests Alice take the well-
lit route (compared to the dark route in the sympathetic case).
Results Across the 9 scenarios containing empathetic
agents, 87% of participants either strongly agreed or agreed
with statement (1) and 82% either strongly agreed or agreed
with statement (2). Results comparing participants’ percep-
tions of the agent’s empathetic abilities demonstrated a statis-
tically significant difference in ratings of scenarios containing
empathetic agents (M=4.21, SD=1.01), compared to sympa-
thetic agents (M=1.72, SD=0.73), t(39)= 12.48, p < 0.01.
7 Discussion and Summary
In this work, we have introduced the notion of EmP which
we formally specified by appealing to a rich epistemic logic
framework and building upon epistemic planning paradigms.
We proposed a computational realization of EmP as epistemic
planning that enables the use of existing epistemic planners.
We conducted a study which demonstrated the potential bene-
fits of assistive empathetic agents in a diversity of scenarios as
well as participants’ favorable perceptions of the empathetic
agent’s assistive capabilities. It has been claimed recently that
richer representational frameworks are needed to bridge some
of the gaps in current virtual assistants - AI systems that fre-
quently interact with human users [Cohen, 2018]. The sce-
narios we have presented illustrate precisely this need in the
context of reasoning over the beliefs and goals of agents and
our approach is well-suited to address such settings.
There is a diverse body of research related to the
ideas presented here. Empathy has been incorporated
into intelligent agent systems in various settings (e.g.,
[Aylett et al., 2005]) but has not appealed to generative epis-
temic planning techniques. Work on BDI has explored no-
tions of epistemic reasoning [Sindlar et al., 2008] and affect
[Steunebrink et al., 2007], but has typically not appealed to
the flexibility of AI planning to generate plans. There exist
many avenues for future work such as the integration of af-
fect into our framework. Future work could also appeal to
related work which attempts to reconcile the human’s model
[Chakraborti et al., 2017] when providing the humanwith ex-
planations (e.g., informing them of the bus’ status). Lastly,
partially observable settings will be addressed, where the em-
pathtizer may have uncertainty regarding the mental state of
the empathizee, as well as the environment in general.
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